

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 298967 TOSEC 320083

EXDIS ----- FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR; US; USSR

SUBJECT: TRANSITION PAPER-USSR (DRAFT)

HEREWITH THE TEXT OF SUBJECT PAPER:

BEGIN TEXT: OVERVIEW: STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES OF US POLICY.

DESPITE THE FACT THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY DEFINED TO DEATH OF LATE, THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES THAT UNDERLIE IT ARE STILL IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD BY LARGE PORTIONS OF THE US PUBLIC. PART OF THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT BOTH US POLICYMAKERS AND THE PUBLIC SEE THE PROCESS VERY DIFFERENTLY THAN THE SOVIETS DO, AND DRAWING THIS CONTRAST SERVES TO HIGHLIGHT THE POLICY ISSUES WHICH FACE US.

-- US POLICYMAKERS SAW ENGAGEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AS THE BEST WAY OF MANAGING THE PROBLEM OF ITS EMERGENCE AS A TRUE SUPERPOWER WITH GLOBAL REACH AND INTERESTS. THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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INVOLVES CREATING A CALCULUS OF RISKS AND BENEFITS FOR THE SOVIETS WHICH ENCOURAGES RESTRAINT IN THE USE OF THEIR GROWING POWER. YET FOR OUR PART WE HAVE NOT--BECAUSE OF FACTORS SUCH AS TRADE LEGISLATION AND LAGS IN THE SALT

PROCESS--BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL STAKE WHICH MOSCOW WOULD RISK BY TROUBLEMAKING. AND THE SOVIETS PERSIST IN DENYING THAT DETENTE IMPOSES RESTRAINTS ON THEM IN AREAS WHERE THEIR IDEOLOGY AND INTERNAL PRACTICES COME HEAVILY INTO PLAY (E.G., THEORIES OF "NATIONAL LIBERATION" AND HUMAN RIGHTS).

-- BOTH THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SEE THE PROCESS OF ENGAGEMENT AS A CATALYST WHICH OVER TIME SHOULD LEAD THE SOVIETS IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER OPENNESS AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIETS SEE ENGAGEMENT AS A NECESSARY EVIL BUT POTENTIALLY A CHALLENGE TO THE HEGEMONY OF THE PARTY; THEY TRY SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PLACATE WESTERN OPINION, TO EXTRACT THE BENEFITS OF ENGAGEMENT, AND TO HEIGHTEN VIGILANCE AGAINST THE INFECTION OF LIBERALISM. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXPANDED CONTACTS ON THE US/USSR AGENDA--THANKS IN PART TO HELSINKI AND THE CSCE.

-- THE SOVIETS DEMAND POLITICAL RECOGNITION FOR HAVING ACHIEVED STRATEGIC PARITY, BUT ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ADVOCATE "SUPERIORITY." THE US BUREAUCRACY HAS ONLY ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF PARITY HALF-HEARTEDLY, WITH GLANCES OVER ITS SHOULDER AT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WHICH FEELS THAT "SUPERIORITY" IS THE ONLY SAFE WAY TO GO.

-- THE US AND THE USSR BOTH SEE TRADE IN A HIGHLY POLITICAL CONTEXT, BUT POPULAR US EXPECTATIONS OF THE LEVERAGE THE USG SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXERT PROBABLY MOTIVATE THE KREMLIN TO PROVE IT DOESN'T EXIST. THE SOVIETS NEED US GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY, AND WILL PROBABLY PAY A TACIT POLITICAL PRICE TO GET THEM. BUT SPECIFIC LINKAGE TO NON-ECONOMIC ISSUES HAS NOT WORKED IN THE PAST, AND PROBABLY WILL NOT SO LONG AS MOSCOW HAS ALTERNATIVES AND SO LONG AS INTEREST GROUPS IN THE US DISAGREE AS TO THE PROPER ROLE OF EAST-WEST TRADE.
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-- THE 1974 DOCUMENT ON "PRINCIPLES OF US-USSR RELATIONS" OFFERED CONSULTATIONS AS COMPENSATION FOR RESTRAINT, AND THE SOVIETS BADLY WANT INTO THE LOOP ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. BUT OUR OWN INTERESTS, AS WELL AS MOSCOW'S PROPENSITY TO SUPPORT MAXIMUM ARAB DEMANDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ACT AS A SPOILER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC MATTERS, HAS LED US TO EXCLUDE THEM IN THE PAST. AND MOSCOW IN TURN HAS EXCUSED OPPORTUNISM AS COMPENSATION FOR BEING LEFT OUT.

AS THE PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATION WITH US HAS SLOWED, AND CHANGES IN CHINA, THE US AND EUROPE HAVE PRESENTED MOSCOW WITH PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITIES, THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP

HAS EMBARKED ON A MORE ACTIVIST POLICY. WHILE NO
DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGHS ARE IN SIGHT, A MORE ACTIVE AND
ASSERTIVE SOVIET POLICY WORLD-WIDE COULD CAST A PALL OVER
DETENTE UNLESS WE CAN DEVISE AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO
RESTRAIN OR DIVERT IT. BUT GIVEN THE CONSTANCY OF THE
FACTORS WE BELIEVE LED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO EMBRACE
DETENTE INITIALLY, SUCH AN APPROACH IS FEASIBLE. THEY
CONTINUE TO FEAR NUCLEAR WAR AND WISH TO AVOID CONFRONTA-
TION AND THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES OF SPIRAL-
LING ARMS EXPENDITURES. THEY WANT ACCESS TO US AND
WESTERN GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY, AND THE CHINA FACTOR AND
THE BELIEF THAT SOVIET POLITICAL INTERESTS CAN BE BEST
ADVANCED IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF
REDUCED TENSIONS ARE AS CENTRAL TO SOVIET THINKING NOW
AS THEY WERE FOUR YEARS AGO.

THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER

MOSCOW IS EAGERLY WAITING TO ENGAGE THE NEW ADMINIS-
TRATION. AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 9 BREZHNEV CALLED FOR A
RETURN TO THE AGENDA "INTERRUPTED BY THE ELECTION
CAMPAIGN." ON NOVEMBER 30 HE TOLD SIMON THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD NOT CONFRONT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WITH A
"TEST OF NERVES" AFTER COMING TO OFFICE, BUT PUBLICLY
STRESSED THE NEED FOR URGENT PROGRESS ON THE TWO ISSUES
WHICH HEAD MOSCOW'S LIST: SALT II, AND REVISION OF US
TRADE LEGISLATION LINKING CREDITS AND MFN TO EMIGRATION.
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BREZHNEV'S ASSURANCES WERE PLAYED AGAINST A COUNTER-
POINT OF GROUSING ABOUT US DEFENSE SPENDING AND A REMINDER
THAT MOSCOW HAS OPTIONS OF ITS OWN. THERE ARE PLAUSIBLE
REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY
UNTIL NEXT FALL. IT WOULD BE OUT OF CHARACTER FOR THE
BREZHNEV REGIME TO THROW DOWN THE GAUNTLET TO A NEW
AMERICAN PRESIDENT. BUT IT WOULD BE EQUALLY OUT OF
CHARACTER FOR THEM NOT TO PURSUE WHATEVER OPPORTUNITIES
THEY PERCEIVE IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. DIRECT AND IN-
DIRECT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THEY BELIEVE THEIR MAIN CHANCE
IS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CHINA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. WHETHER
OR NOT THEY GET ANYWHERE, THEY CERTAINLY CAN ANTICIPATE
THAT SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THESE AREAS WILL GET WASHINGTON'S
ATTENTION. AT THE SAME TIME THEY REMAIN MINDFUL THAT
THEIR ALWAYS UNSTABLE "REAR" IN EASTERN EUROPE IS
UNUSUALLY VOLATILE AT THIS JUNCTURE.

THE MOMENTUM BEGAN TO DRAIN FROM US-USSR RELATIONSHIPS
IN 1974, AND ALMOST DISAPPEARED AS 1975 WORE ON. SOME OF
THE RHETORICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH FLOWED FROM
POLITICAL PROGRESS ON CENTRAL ISSUES VANISHED, AND THE
GENERAL MOOD SOURED.

BUT THE AGENDA OF PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED AND DEADLINES TO BE MET WILL PRESS THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. MATTERS AS CRITICAL AS THE OCTOBER SALT DEADLINE, AS PROBLEMATIC AS RATIFICATION OF THE TTB AND PNE TREATIES, AS SENSITIVE AS THE BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE IN JUNE, AS SYMBOLIC AS EXCHANGES AND AS NAGGING AS THE EXACTION OF RECIPROCITY WILL BE ON THE DESK OF THE NEW SECRETARY. THIS IS A NEW EXPERIENCE FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD, REFLECTING THE DEGREE TO WHICH RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR HAVE BROADENED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. WHILE THE VESTED INTERESTS WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN BUILDING CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY, THEY ALSO DEMAND THAT A NEW ADMINISTRATION PUT ITS OWN STAMP ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS BEFORE THE EVENTS FACING US TAKE CHARGE.

SUMMITRY

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MOSCOW HAS NOT YET BROACHED THE IDEA OF AN EARLY SUMMIT TO US, BUT THEY ARE ALREADY SPECULATING TO OTHERS THAT A GET ACQUAINTED MEETING IN A NEUTRAL CAPITAL WOULD BE A LOGICAL IDEA. THE SOVIETS LOVE SUMMITS, PARTLY BECAUSE THEY LIKE TO TAKE THE MEASURE OF THEIR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS FIRST HAND AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY LIKE THE POSITIVE EFFECT ON THEIR WORLD IMAGE. THE TWO-TRACK NEGOTIATING APPROACH, COUPLING INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN REGULAR CHANNELS WITH SHORT CIRCUITS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, CREATES BOTH PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR US. THE PROBLEMS ARE IN LARGE PART IN THE EXPECTATIONS CREATED BY SUMMITRY AT HOME AND ABROAD, BUT FEW WOULD ARGUE THAT SUMMITRY AS A NEGOTIATING TOOL CAN BE DISPENSED WITH ENTIRELY.

STRATEGIC ISSUES

DESPITE INTENSE DEBATE ON STRATEGIC AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, PUBLIC ATTITUDES REMAIN CONFUSED AND CONTRADICTORY. POLLS FOR INSTANCE SHOW THAT THE PUBLIC BELIEVES, ON THE ONE HAND, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CHEATED ON EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND YET, THAT THE US SHOULD SEEK A NEW SALT ACCORD. ALTHOUGH THE SALT PROCESS IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE SOVIETS, A MAJORITY OF AMERICANS WILL SAY THAT WE SHOULD "MAINTAIN SUPERIORITY." THE IDEA THAT WE SHOULD PURSUE STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY AND THAT RESTRAINT MAY BE AN IMPORTANT KEY TO NATIONAL SECURITY IS NOT EASILY GRASPED. MANY INSTINCTIVELY BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BUY, NOT DETERRENCE, BUT INVULNERABILITY THROUGH AN OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF STRATEGIC HARDWARE.

THE PROBLEM IS COMPOUNDED BY THE UNFORTUNATE FACT
THAT AMONG ADVOCATES OF "SUFFICIENCY" THERE IS LITTLE
ENOUGH AGREEMENT ABOUT HARD NUMBERS. NOR SHOULD WE FORGET

THE EFFECT ON THE PUBLIC OF REPORTS
WHICH CLAIM THAT THE
SOVIETS MAY BE SEEKING "SUPERIORITY." THE CONCEPT OF
PARITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR A DEFINITION OF ACTUAL
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STRATEGIC LEVELS IS AS YET ILL UNDERSTOOD. NUMERICAL
COMPARISONS OF SUCH THINGS AS MISSILE INVENTORIES AND
THROW-WEIGHT HAVE, AT LEAST SUPERFICIALLY, GREAT
PERSUASIVENESS. ARGUMENTS ABOUT QUALITATIVE OFFSETS,
ETC., ARE MUCH LESS CONVINCING.

SINCE 1969, THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN THE
CENTERPIECE OF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND A PROFOUNDLY
IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH PROGRESS
CONTINUED ON SECONDARY ISSUES AT THE DELEGATION LEVEL AT
GENEVA, FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THE
BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILES HAVE PREVENTED US FROM
BRINGING SALT II TO A CONCLUSION.

ANY SALT II AGREEMENT WILL HAVE TO NOURISH A RENEWED
DOMESTIC CONSENSUS THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS ENHANCE OUR
SECURITY. IN THIS RESPECT, THERE WILL BE THREE MAIN
ISSUES: (1) VERIFIABILITY; (2) SOVIET RELIABILITY IN
ADHERING TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND (3) PERCEIVED
AREAS OF US AND SOVIET EQUALITY. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO
REMEMBER THAT SALT IS WATCHED CLOSELY -- AND PUBLIC
OPINION IS AFFECTED -- BY GROUPS WHOSE VIEWS, THOUGH
EXPERT, ARE ALSO OFTEN CONTRADICTORY. ON THIS LEVEL, A
SALT AGREEMENT MUST: (1) INDICATE PERSUASIVELY TO "ARMS
CONTROLLERS" THAT SERIOUS PROGRESS IS BEING MADE, AS
OPPOSED TO "MERE" CODIFICATION OF EXISTING HIGH LEVELS OF
WEAPONRY, AND (2) PERSUADE MODERATE "DEFENSE-MINDED"
ANALYSTS THAT US BASIC REQUIREMENTS ARE ADEQUATELY HEDGED.

IN ADDITION TO SALT II, THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN/
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES WILL BE UP FOR SENATE
HEARINGS IN JANUARY AND BOTH THE CONGRESS AND THE SOVIETS
WILL WANT TO KNOW THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. AND
THE ABM AND SEABED TREATIES ARE UP FOR REVIEW IN 1977 AND
WE MUST DETERMINE OUR OBJECTIVES.

MULTILATERAL SECURITY ISSUES

ASIDE FROM MBFR, WHICH IS TREATED IN A SEPARATE PAPER,
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF "ACTION-FORCING" MULTILATERAL
DISARMAMENT ISSUES ON THE BILATERAL US-USSR AGENDA:
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-- DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) LIMITATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE HELD AGAIN DURING THE SPRING CCD. IF WE ARE TO PURSUE OUR 1974 SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP A JOINT CW INITIATIVE, HOWEVER, WE WILL NEED TO DECIDE ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF PROHIBITIONS WE ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT.

-- THE SOVIETS WILL BE RAISING THEIR INITIATIVE ON BANNING NEW TYPES AND NEW SYSTEMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS IN THE CCD. WE HAVE REJECTED JANUARY BILATERALS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE, BUT MUST DECIDE ON WHETHER TO SEND EXPERTS TO THE CCD DISCUSSIONS.

-- WE ARE COMMITTED TO DISCUSSING WITH THE SOVIETS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO IMPLEMENT OUR NEW CCD INITIATIVE ON BANNING USE OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

-- IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION FIELD, WE HAVE HELD, AND WILL WANT TO CONTINUE TO HOLD, AD HOC CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' GROUP AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. IN HIS NOVEMBER 30 SPEECH AT THE SIMON DINNER, BREZHNEV EXPRESSED READINESS TO CONSIDER NEW APPROACHES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. THIS REFLECTS THE LONG-STANDING SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND THEIR DESIRE TO SEE MORE CONTROLS ON THE FUEL CYCLE.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE PRC

THE NORMALIZATION OF US-PRC RELATIONS HAS BEEN A FACTOR DRIVING THE SOVIETS TO DETENTE. WE MUST BEAR IN MIND, THAT CHINA IS A MAJOR ASIAN POWER, BUT THE USSR IS A GLOBAL SUPERPOWER. US-PRC RELATIONS CAN STRONGLY AFFECT, BUT CANNOT SUPPLANT, US-SOVIET RELATIONS. FOR OUR PART, WE MUST TRY TO WORK BOTH RELATIONSHIPS TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION.

MOSCOW HAS HAD FIVE YEARS TO ADJUST TO US-PRC RELATIONS AND HAS GENERALLY CONCLUDED THAT CHINA'S WEAKNESS IN CONFIDENTIAL

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GLOBAL TERMS, ITS INTERNAL PREOCCUPATIONS, AND THE OBSTACLE OF TAIWAN POSE LIMITS TO SINO-US RELATIONS.

MOSCOW'S POISE COULD, HOWEVER, BE DANGEROUSLY SHAKEN BY RAPID CHINESE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. AND IF THE US APPEARED TO BE HELPING CHINA ACQUIRE MODERN WEAPONS THE WHOLE SALT PROCESS IN PARTICULAR COULD BE ENDANGER-

ED. A PRONOUNCED PRO-CHINA TILT BY THE JAPANESE WOULD ALSO ACCENTUATE SOVIET CONCERN.

CURRENT SOVIET GESTURES TOWARD CHINA HAVE BEEN PARTLY AIMED FOR THEIR EFFECT ON WASHINGTON. ALTHOUGH IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS TO THE CHINESE OR THAT PEKING WOULD RECIPROCATATE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, MOSCOW APPARENTLY INTENDS TO PERSIST IN THIS POSTURING. IN THE LONG RUN, SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS MAY IMPROVE, AND THE TEST OF US POLICY TOWARD THE USSR AND THE PRC WILL BE ITS ABILITY TO SURVIVE A LIMITED RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THEM AND STILL SERVE US INTERESTS.

EUROPE

ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IF ACCOMPANIED BY A SWING TO THE LEFT IN ITALY OR FRANCE, THREATENS ALLIED UNITY. THE SOVIETS NEED ACCESS TO WESTERN EUROPE'S ECONOMIC STRENGTH IN THE FORM OF TRADE, TECHNOLOGY AND CREDITS, BUT THEY ALSO WANT TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL THREAT POSED BY THAT STRENGTH AND THE UNITY WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO IT. THUS, THE US RESPONSE TO SUCH WESTERN EUROPEAN ISSUES AS THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES; EUROCOMMUNISM; US-ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER THE MATTER OF NUCLEAR BALANCE, MBFR, AND OTHER ALLIANCE PROBLEMS; AND THE COMPLEX OF AEGEAN CONCERNS WILL AFFECT THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET WESTPOLITIK.

THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO VIEW EASTERN EUROPE AS A VITAL SECURITY BUFFER, BUT WESTERN INTEREST IN THE REGION
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AND ITS INCREASING VOLATILITY CREATE PROBLEMS. ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA HAS OBSCURED THE INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION IN POLAND, WHICH MOSCOW SEES AS A MORE IMMEDIATE--AND VITAL--PROBLEM. WE CAN PURSUE OUR INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE BY INTENSIFYING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES AND ENCOURAGING THE USE OF CSCE TO WIN GREATER ELBOW ROOM FOR EE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. BUT SENSITIVE QUESTIONS SUCH AS A MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ROMANIA MUST BE HANDLED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD

IN THE AREAS DISCUSSED SO FAR THE BASIC PARAMETERS OF US-SOVIET INTERACTION ARE MORE-OR-LESS WELL ESTABLISHED. IT IS IN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE INSTABILITY AND THE DECLINE OF WESTERN INFLUENCE INVITE SOVIET EFFORTS

TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. AND NEW SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES, ARMS SALES AND DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE INITIATIVES GIVE THEM A TRULY GLOBAL PRESENCE.

YET THE SOVIET RECORD OF SUCCESSES IN THE THIRD WORLD IS MIXED, AND THE TIDE OF ANTI-COLONIALISM AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION" HAS ALL BUT RECEDED. INCREASINGLY THE SOVIETS ARE SEEN AS IRRELEVANT TO THE ECONOMIC ISSUES WHICH HEAD THE THIRD WORLD AGENDA AND UNWILLING TO DO THEIR SHARE IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. THE ROLE OF CHINA IS FREQUENTLY SIGNIFICANT AND PEKING'S DEVELOPMENT MODEL HAS REAL APPEAL.

IF THESE TRENDS CONTINUE THE SOVIETS WILL BE ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN AND A NEW PATTERN OF RESTRAINT BY MUTUAL EXAMPLE MAY EMERGE. BUT IN THE MEANTIME THE SOVIETS CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT THEIR ENHANCED POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES HAVE EARNED THEM PARITY WITH THE US IN THE THIRD WORLD AND AT THE HIGH TABLE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN CRITICAL AREAS SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

OUR CONCERN IS TWO-FOLD: TO KEEP THEM FROM USING CONFIDENTIAL

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THEIR MUSCLE UNDER COVER OF DETENTE TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AS THEY DID IN ANGOLA, AND TO AVOID PRESENTING TO THE WORLD AN IMAGE OF US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM. IN

TERMS OF US-USSR RELATIONS AND FINDING LASTING SOLUTIONS TO THIRD-WORLD PROBLEMS AND CRISES, A SOVIET ROLE IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE HIGHLY ADVANTAGEOUS IF MANAGED WELL, BUT THE COSTS OF INCLUDING OR EXCLUDING THEM IN SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE WEIGHED CAREFULLY. THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES IN SOME AREAS FOR EXAMINING THE ADVISABILITY OF BOTH OF US "STAYING OUT," ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY AREA.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY, TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

LAST YEAR'S DISASTROUS HARVEST LED TO AN UPSURGE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY INDEBTEDNESS, HARDSHIPS FOR CONSUMERS AND A FURTHER DOWNTURN IN AN ALREADY STAGNATING GROWTH RATE. THIS YEAR'S BUMPER CROP REPRESENTS A BADLY NEEDED SHOT IN THE ARM. BUT THE GROWING

LABOR SHORTAGE, THE PRESSURE ON HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS THAT WILL COME AS DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR PETROLEUM OVERTAKES SUPPLY, AND THE FAILURE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC REFORM PROMISE THAT TRADE WITH THE WEST WILL BECOME MORE IMPORTANT WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME. AND MOSCOW INCREASINGLY FEELS IT

CANNOT AFFORD TO BE LEFT OUT OF EVOLVING WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS.

GIVEN THE NEED FOR TRADE AND THE POLITICAL DRIVE TO
BE ACCEPTED AS THE EQUAL OF THE DEVELOPED WEST, IT IS
NOT SURPRISING THAT REVISION OF US TRADE LEGISLATION--
EXTENSION OF MFN AND ACCESS TO EXIM CREDITS--SHARES
WITH SALT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN MOSCOW. THE QUESTION
IS WHAT PRICE THE SOVIET LEADERS MIGHT PAY IN TERMS
OF EMIGRATION TO OBTAIN WHAT THEY WANT. IN SPITE OF
MOSCOW'S BRIEF 1973 FLIRTATION WITH NEGOTIATING A WAY
OUT OF THE JACKSON-VANIK IMPASSE, THE SOVIETS ARE NOW
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MOST UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE ANYTHING CLOSE TO THE "ASSURANCES"
REQUIRED BY THE LEGISLATION. A RECENT UPTURN IN
EMIGRATION FIGURES SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE
PREPARED TO IMPROVE THE DE FACTO EMIGRATION SITUATION
IF REVISION OF THE TRADE ACT AGAIN SEEMS A POSSIBLE
ITEM ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA.

IN THE BROADER AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL,
CHANGES IN SOVIET ATTITUDES HAVE BEEN GLACIAL. BUT
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF HUNDREDS OF YEARS OF RUSSIAN
REPRESSION AND SOVIET TERROR, THE CHANGES HAVE NONETHE-
LESS BEEN REAL. HARDLY A WEEK GOES BY WITHOUT OUR
ENGAGING THE SOVIETS OFFICIALLY AND BILATERALLY IN A
DISCUSSION OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, AND THEY
HAVE COME AT LEAST FAR ENOUGH IN ACCEPTING THIS AS A
LEGITIMATE TOPIC FOR DISCOURSE TO RECIPROCATATE BY
CRITICISING OUR PERFORMANCE IN TURN.

CSCE OFFERS THE BEST VEHICLE FOR ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE
ON THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL, AND WITH THE JUNE 1977
BELGRADE MEETING ON CSCE LOOMING LARGER THE PROVISIONS
OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CAN BE USED INCREASINGLY AS
A TOOL TO IMPROVE SOVIET PERFORMANCE. ONE OF THE
OFTEN OVERLOOKED BENEFITS OF CSCE IS THAT THE ATTENTION
OF THE WORLD IS FOCUSED ON SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AREA, WITH THE ENTIRE CIVILIZED WEST
UNIFIED ON THE HIGH GROUND.

SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES

ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING RESULTS OF THE LAST FEW
YEARS IN US-USSR RELATIONS HAS BEEN THE QUANTUM JUMP
IN EXCHANGES, BOTH UNDER THE GENERAL UMBRELLA OF THE
CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS AND
UNDER THE RUBRIC OF THE 11 BILATERAL SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED SINCE 1972. OUR LONG-
RANGE AIM HAS BEEN TO CREATE A LARGER VESTED INTEREST
WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY IN PEACEFUL COOPERATION

WITH THE US, THOUGH WE HAVE NOT BEEN SO OPTIMISTIC AS
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TO BELIEVE THAT EXCHANGES BY THEMSELVES WOULD DETER
SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

JOINT COMMITTEE MEETINGS UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS,
INVOLVING US CABINET OFFICERS, AND DECISIONS ON
WHETHER TO RENEW, CONSOLIDATE, OR PRUNE THE AGREEMENTS
TO PROVIDE A BETTER RETURN TO THE US SIDE FACE THE
NEW ADMINISTRATION. AND THE ISSUE OF EXPANDING THE
EXCHANGES AGENDA TO INCLUDE TOP LEVEL POLITICAL AND
MILITARY FIGURES WILL SOON SURFACE AGAIN IF RELATIONS
SEEM TO BE IMPROVING.

OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES

DAY-TO-DAY ROUTINE REPRESENTS THE CORE OF US-SOVIET
RELATIONS. HERE TOUGH BARGAINING AND THE EXACTION OF
RECIPROCITY ARE REQUIRED AS ISSUES BECOME ARTIFICIALLY
ISOLATED AND CONFLICTING BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS COME
INTO PLAY.

-- SOVIET FAILURE TO USE US SHIPS TO CARRY ONE THIRD
OF OUR GRAIN EXPORTS TO THE USSR VIOLATES OUR GRAIN
AND MARITIME AGREEMENTS AND COULD LEAD US TO RETALIATE
BY MAKING ACCESS TO US PORTS MORE DIFFICULT.

-- IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO STONEWALL ON OUR EFFORTS
TO GET FOR PAN AM A FAIRER SHARE OF CIVIL AIR REVENUES
THROUGH POOLING, WE MAY HAVE TO START CUTTING BACK ON
AEROFLOT FLIGHTS HERE.

-- THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BEAM MICROWAVES AGAINST
OUR MOSCOW EMBASSY, THOUGH AT LEVELS WHICH CREATE NO
HEALTH HAZARD. THEY SHOW NO SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO
TURN THEM OFF ENTIRELY, AND THE ALTERNATIVES TO
LIVING WITH THEM ARE NOT PROMISING.

-- THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN

THIS COUNTRY CONTINUES TO GROW AT A MUCH FASTER RATE
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THAN US PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND CONTROL OF
THIS TREND MAY BE CALLED FOR.

CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE

IN GENERAL THE CONGRESS SHARES THE PUBLIC'S AMBIGUITY

ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION--SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF
DETENTE COMBINED WITH SKEPTICISM OVER THE WAY IN
WHICH IT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED AND WITH DISTRUST OF
THE SOVIET UNION. AS THE BLOOM WENT FROM THE DETENTE
ROSE, THE CONGRESS BECAME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF
DECISIONS IT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN. GREATER INVOLVEMENT
OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS IN FORMAL EXCHANGES WITH THE
SOVIETS PAID POSITIVE DIVIDENDS, BUT BRINGING MEMBERS
INTO MORE SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WOULD CREATE NEW PROBLEMS
TOGETHER WITH NEW OPPORTUNITIES. BY AND LARGE THE
SOVIETS HAVE GAINED GREATLY IN SOPHISTICATION IN
TREATING WITH THE CONGRESS, TOLERATING CONGRESSIONAL
VISITORS' MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENTS AND GIVING THEM
WIDER EXPOSURE TO POLICY LEVELS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY.
BUT MOSCOW HAS A LONG WAY TO GO IN APPRECIATING THE
POLICY ROLE THE CONGRESS PLAYS, AND THE DENIAL OF
VISAS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL CSCE COMMISSION SHOWS THE
LIMITS BEYOND WHICH MOSCOW WON'T GO.

THE POLICY SET OF THE 96TH CONGRESS IS DIFFICULT TO
PREDICT, BUT IF PAST TRENDS PERSIST THE COALITION OF
LIBERALS WHO THINK WE ARE NOT TRYING HARD ENOUGH ON
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND CONSERVATIVES WHO DON'T TRUST
MOSCOW COULD ENSURE THAT ANY ARMS CONTROL TREATY WITH
MOSCOW WILL FACE TOUGH SLEDDING. ON TRADE LEGISLATION,
CONGRESSIONAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE STATUS QUO
COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO WILLINGNESS TO EXPERIMENT
WITH AMENDMENT OF CURRENT RESTRICTIONS IF THE GENERAL
POLITICAL CLIMATE IS IMPROVING. AND THE FOCUS ON THE
JUNE 1977 CSCE REVIEW IN BELGRADE AND THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL CSCE COMMISSION PROMISE INCREASED
CONCERN ON THE HILL WITH SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ATTITUDES.
END TEXT. ROBINSON

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